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Exploded Dream: Desegregation in the
Memphis City Schools
Daniel Kielt
What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore-
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over-
like a syrupy sweet?
Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.
Or does it explode?
- Langston Hughes1
Introduction
For Gerald Young, the first day of school in 1958 was not
quite ordinary. Eight-year-old Gerald was supposed to begin
fourth grade that morning at Hyde Park Elementary.2 Like every
other Black student in the Memphis City Schools, Gerald was to
attend an all-Black school even though the United States Supreme
Court had declared four years earlier that "separate [schools] are
inherently unequal. "
However, on the morning of September 3, 1958, Gerald's
t. Adjunct Professor, University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of
Law; Research Associate, Center for Research in Educational Policy, University of
Memphis. Special thanks to Gary Orfield, Director of the Civil Rights Project, and
to the librarians in the Memphis and Shelby County Room at the Memphis Public
Library. Please send comments to dkiel@post.harvard.edu.
1. Langston Hughes, Harlem [2] (1951), reprinted in THE COLLECTED POEMS
OF LANGSTON HUGHES 426, 426 (Arnold Rampersad & David Roessel eds. 1995).
2. Integration Move Fails in Memphis, Negro Child Turned Away at
Vollentine: Parent Is Undecided About Lawsuit, MEMPHIS PRESS-SCIMITAR, Sept. 4,
1958 [hereinafter Negro Child Turned Away] (on file with Memphis Public
Library).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that
"separate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
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mother had other plans.4 Rather than traversing the ten blocks to
Hyde Park, Gerald and his mother attempted to enroll on that
first day of school at Vollentine Elementary, an all-White school
more than five blocks closer.' Their enrollment was denied.6 The
Tennessee Pupil Assignment Law, which governed all transfer
requests, did not permit transfers for mere convenience.' So
denied, Gerald was left to return to Hyde Park and school
segregation lived on in the Memphis City Schools.
The refusal to admit Gerald Young to Vollentine marked the
beginning of the struggle to bring the spirit of the Brown v. Board
of Education8 decision to Memphis. In many ways, that struggle
continues today.9 Nearly half a century after Gerald was sent
back to attend fourth grade at an all-Black elementary school,
integrated education is elusive for most students in Memphis.'"
This Article traces the story of the litigation that formally
desegregated the Memphis City Schools. It examines an era,
1961-74, in which the schools, and the city around them, stepped
out of Jim Crow segregation and into a new age of racial
difficulties." The racial divisions that plague Memphis today are
rooted in this time.'2 The present is not so different from the past
and the successes, and failures of this episode in civic history offer
Memphians today a valuable perspective.
This Article follows the case of Northcross v. Board of
Education of the Memphis City Schools from its origins 3 through a
period of slow but peaceful desegregation in the 1960s and into the
more confrontational busing debates of the early 1970s. The
Memphis school desegregation is typical of desegregation during
this period in many ways. The familiar themes of initial
4. Negro Child Turned Away, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts 13, 41 (listing all factors a local board may
consider in determining whether a student may be transferred); Placement Law
Cited in Retort to School Suit, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May 7, 1960 (on file
with Memphis Public Library).
8. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. See infra Part III (discussing the racial makeup of Memphis schools today).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See CHRISTOPHER SILVER & JOHN V. MOESER, THE SEPARATE CITY: BLACK
COMMUNITIES IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1940-1968, at 97-101 (1995) (discussing the
racial conflict that emerged following the first judgment in the Northcross litigation
in 1961).
12. See infra Part III.




resistance, reluctant and token desegregation, contentious busing,
and White flight all appear in the Memphis narrative. However,
Memphis is unique in the degree to which racially-identifiable
school systems survived the desegregation litigation. Unlike in
Nashville, Tennessee and Charlotte, North Carolina, the city
schools were never consolidated with the neighboring county
district, leaving two public school systems--one largely White, the
other largely Black-in a single metropolitan area. 4 Further, the
private schools in Memphis, some of which were created to
accommodate the massive White flight of the mid-1970s,
succeeded to an extraordinary degree in providing an affordable
permanent alternative to the city schools.1" By 1990, Memphis's
private schools were found to be the most segregated in the
nation.'6 Despite its tortuous history and its continued effect on
the nation's 21st largest school district, 7 no scholar has yet fully
examined the Northcross case in its historical context. This
Article seeks to begin filling that void.
In addition to providing insight into how Brown impacted
Memphis, this detailed case study provides guidance for both civic
groups seeking to litigate for social change and for civic leaders
seeking to move communities toward embracing diversity in
education. For the civic groups, Memphis provides a cautionary
tale riddled with examples of litigation's limits in substantially
altering entrenched social structures. For civic leaders, Memphis
illustrates how hope and progressive judicial policies are easily
thwarted by unwelcoming communities and leaders. As school
districts across the country seek to embrace diversity voluntarily
14. Richard E. Day, North Carolina, in CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A.: PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
SOUTHERN STATES 57, 86 (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights ed., Greenwood Press 1968)
(1962) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A.] (explaining that the Charlotte School
District merged with the surrounding county school district); Eugene Wyatt,
Tennessee, in CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A. supra, at 105, 118 (explaining the same as to
Nashville).
15. See generally SEAN F. REARDON & JOHN T. YUN, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
PRIVATE SCHOOL RACIAL ENROLLMENTS AND SEGREGATION 42-44 (2002). "White
private school enrollment rates increased sharply in the years immediately
following the Brown decision and peaked at roughly 16% from 1958 to 1965 .
Id. at 17. The parents chose to do this so their children would be kept out of the
desegregated schools. See id. at 43.
16. See id. at 27 tbl.12. Table 12 details "the racial composition and private
school rates of the 40 largest school districts for the 1989-90 school year." Id. at 26.
During this time period, 13% of all students in Memphis enrolled in private schools.
Of those students, 38% were White and 3% were Black. At 13.6:1, this was the
highest ratio of White students to Black students in the study.
17. Memphis City Schools Facts, http://www.mcsk12.net/admin/
communications/facts.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008).
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without running afoul of the new constitutional landscape
announced in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District," the Memphis case study is a model for what may
happen when large segments of a community abandon a school
district. Finally, the current inequities in school quality among
the schools in the Memphis metropolitan area' 9 suggest that the
courts' focus on a school's racial makeup to the exclusion of its
educational quality may have been a failed strategy. Ultimately,
though, this is a story about how a single community dealt with
decades of Supreme Court mandates in the wake of Brown and
ultimately avoided offering more than a handful of students an
education in a diverse environment.
I. Initial Inaction: 1954-61
A. The Brown Decisions and the Memphis City Schools
In 1869, the fourth city school charter for the City of
Memphis established the Board of Education of the Memphis City
Schools and declared that the "Board of Education shall provide
and maintain separate schools for the use and accommodation of
the [W]hite and colored youths of the city."2 The Memphis City
Schools had functioned under this charter segregating school
facilities for eighty-five years when, on May 17, 1954, the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously declared that "in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."2'
The Brown decision effectively declared the Memphis school
system, and many others across the country, to be
unconstitutional. Capping a long struggle by attorneys for the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP") to legally dismantle the doctrine of "separate but
equal" endorsed by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, the
18. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (holding that plans in Louisville and Seattle using
racial classifications among other factors to allocate students to district. high
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as they failed to justify the use of
racial classifications with a compelling state interest).
19. See infra notes 277-89 and accompanying text.
20. 1869 Tenn. Pub. Acts 142. Chapter 30 of the 1868-69 Tennessee Public
Acts placed the Memphis City Schools under the management and control of the
Board of Education, detailed the duties of the Board, and explained how to choose
its members.
21. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
22. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court held that "the enforced
separation of the races . . . neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the
colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies
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decision shifted the field of legitimacy away from segregationists
and provided a new tool with which to fight to end segregated
schools and facilities. In Memphis and elsewhere, local attorneys
began using that tool.
Some themes dominating the school desegregation struggle in
Memphis over the next two decades became evident on that first
day after Brown. Milton Bowers, Sr., president of the city Board of
Education, insisted that no changes would be made in Brown's
wake.23 "We believe our Negroes will continue using their own
facilities since most of them are in the center of Negro population
areas." 4 Over the next twenty years, federal courts struggled with
ways to integrate schools in this residentially-segregated city-a
problem identified immediately in Bowers's comments.2" Further,
the city repeatedly cited the equality of the schools as a reason to
resist increased integration.26 On this point, the Supreme Court's
message from Brown could not have been more clear: "[sleparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal."27 Yet, the city
would consistently focus on the equality rather than the
separation in resisting desegregation even as repeated mandates
from the courts focused on racial makeup.
Likewise, the Black community immediately recognized the
enormous difficulty of the task presented by Brown. "This will
take time, much time," an editorial in the local Black newspaper
him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 548.
23. Ruling Fails to Shock City; Officials See Little Difficulty, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis, Tenn.), May 18, 1954 (on file with Memphis Public Library)
(summarizing the Memphis Board of Education's response to the Supreme Court
decision outlawing racial segregation in public schools).
24. Id.
25. See Thomas W. Collins, From Courtrooms to Classrooms: Managing School
Desegregation in a Deep South High School, in DESEGREGATED SCHOOLS:
APPRAISALS OF AN AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 89, 91-93 (Ray C. Rist ed., 1979)
(detailing the development of racially segregated neighborhoods in Memphis); see
also Willie W. Herenton, A Historical Study of School Desegregation in the
Memphis City Schools, 1954-1970, at 48 (Aug. 1971) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Southern Illinois University) (on file with author) ("It is a fact that the
Negro population of Memphis is concentrated in certain confined areas in the
western, northern, and southern sections of the city which surround the [Wihite
center city area. It is of interest to note that the school system's zone lines appear
to have been drawn to conform to the configuration of the Negro communities.").
26. See Herenton, supra note 25, at 44 ("Negro schools are fully equal to and in
some instances better than [W]hite schools." (quoting Ruling Fails to Shock City:
Officials See Little Difficulty, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), May 18, 1954 (on file
with Memphis Public Library))).
27. Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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The Tri-State Defender explained.' "There will be no place for
bitterness and rancor, balking and stubbornness, if the job is to be
done right." 9  But, as the Memphis reaction and litigation
unfolded, there was much bitterness, rancor, balking, and
stubbornness, each of which worked as the newspaper predicted to
hamper the desegregation process and limit the effectiveness of
achieving social change through federal litigation.
Although the initial Brown decision laid out a new
constitutional standard, it did not spell out remedies with which
states, cities, and towns were supposed to make the necessary
changes to comply with this new standard. The implementation
decision came a year later on May 31, 1955. 30 Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown II) did not contain the original decision's
rhetoric of equal rights, but it laid out broad guidelines for school
authorities and district courts to begin the process of school
desegregation. Brown II gave primary responsibility of reform to
local authorities, but it gave district courts jurisdiction to consider
whether the action of those authorities constituted good-faith
implementation of the Brown principles,3 The long-term goal,
according to the Court, was for Black students to be admitted "to
public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory
basis."32 The immediate order was for school authorities to make a
"prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance " ' with the
Brown I ruling.'
These mandates--"as soon as practicable," "prompt and
reasonable start," and "full compliance"-lacked any precise
milestones. The Court was more specific, however, in laying out
potential reasons for delay, including
problems related to administration, arising from the physical
condition of the school plant, the school transportation system,
personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas
into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and
revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary
28. Op-Ed., One History-Making Step Forward, TRI-STATE DEFENDER
(Memphis, Tenn.), May 29, 1954 (on file with the Memphis Public Library).
29. Id.
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). In Brown II the
Court considered "the complexities arising from the transition to a system of public
education freed from racial discrimination." Id. at 299.
31. See id. at 299.
32. Id. at 300.
33. Id.




in solving the foregoing problems. 5
The Court thus provided practical flexibility for implementation
and allowed the local district courts to take local public interests
into account. In Memphis and elsewhere, this flexibility was used
by opponents of desegregation to delay implementation as courts
and communities wrestled with the issues the Supreme Court
failed to define in the Brown H.6 The Court's reliance on district
courts proved a significant flaw in implementing Brown, as local
communities used the adversarial and gradual nature of litigation
to delay action and stir public opposition to desegregation. This
was done with particular effectiveness in Memphis.37
B. Widespread Resistance and the Tennessee Pupil
Assignment Law
Displeasure with the Brown decisions reigned throughout the
southern states most affected by them. In March 1956, that
displeasure produced the Southern Manifesto, a document
endorsed by ninety-six members of Congress, calling Brown "a
clear abuse of judicial power."38 The Manifesto was a clear signal
to the local communities charged with implementing Brown that
resistance to desegregation would be acceptable to and supported
by representatives in the federal government, opening the door to
local resistance throughout the South. Although neither of
Tennessee's Senators (Estes Kefauver and Al Gore, Sr.) and less
than half of the State's House delegation signed the Southern
Manifesto, U.S. Representative Clifford Davis of Memphis did sign
it, along with all of the other representatives from western
Tennessee.39
35. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300-01.
36. See Herenton, supra note 25, at 53-54 (quoting Memphis Board of
Education member Mrs. Lawrence Coe as saying "[b]etween 1954 and 1959 the
board took no steps voluntarily to desegregate the schools").
37. See, e.g., Mayor Mulls Boycott Option, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.),
Sept. 2, 1972 (on file with Memphis Public Library) ("Uncertainty still hangs over
just when or if there will be court-ordered busing in Memphis schools. School board
members voted 6-1 Thursday to appeal a court-ordered busing decision and seek a
further stay order pending the appeal. 'If this thing (busing) eventually is to be
defeated, it is going to be through legal channels,' Mayor Chandler said yesterday."
(alteration in original)).
38. See 102 CONG. REC. 4255, 4460 (1956).
39. Id. Memphis sits in the extreme southwest corner of Tennessee and is far
both geographically and culturally from other parts of the state. Indeed, Tennessee
is often divided into three "Grand Divisions"--east, middle, and west-that share
little in common. See Profile to the State of Tennessee,
http://www.tn.gov/tourdev/pdf/stateprofile.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2008). Thus, it is
unsurprising that the representatives from west Tennessee would vote so
2008]
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Soon, the sentiment of the Manifesto led to legislation in
Tennessee and elsewhere intended specifically to curtail, or at
least delay, the desegregation process. Tennessee required racial
organizations to register with the state in order to prevent the
type of organizing by groups, such as the NAACP, that led to the
Brown suits in the first place.4" More significantly, the Tennessee
Pupil Assignment Law, passed in 1957, governed the
desegregation process by placing control in the hands of local
boards of education.41
The Pupil Assignment Law permitted students to transfer
from one school to another without regard to race, subject to
approval of local boards of education.42 In determining whether to
grant a transfer, local boards were to consider twenty-two factors,
including
school capacities;
student and school's geographical locations;
transportation;
effect on the school and the student;
adequacy of academic preparedness;
student's scholastic aptitude and relative intelligence or
mental energy;
effect on other students;
socioeconomic status;
possibility of threat of friction or disorder among pupils or
others;
possibility of breaches of the peace;
any and other factors the board may consider pertinent.43
As is apparent from this list, local school boards were left with
enormous discretion in granting transfers.44 Many of these factors
provided a facially non-racial justification for board members
eager to prevent the integration of any schools to do so, thus
differently from their colleagues from other parts of the state.
40. 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts 508. This Act was written "to promote racial
harmony and tranquility" through the "registration of persons and organizations
engaged in promoting or opposing legislation in behalf of or in opposition to a race
or color. . . ." Id.
41. 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts 40.
42. See id. at 44. To transfer a child out of his or her assigned school, parents
were required to submit a written request to the school board within ten days of the
original assignment. Id.
43. Id. at 41-42.
44. See, e.g., id. at 45. The school board was not "bound by the rules of evidence
applicable in a court" but could instead admit any evidence which would be
accepted by a "reasonable and prudent man." Id.
[Vol. 26:261
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allowing local boards to comply with the letter of Brown while
subverting its spirit. 5
In Memphis, pupil assignment played out exactly as the law
intended, resulting in no desegregation whatsoever." Elementary
schools in Memphis had gerrymandered geographical attendance
zones with Black schools zoned on one map and White schools on
another.47  Thus, it was not only the residential segregation
initially referred to by Board president Bowers, but also deliberate
attendance zoning that maintained segregation in the years
immediately following Brown.4" Residentially segregated
elementary schools fed into junior high schools, which fed in turn
into high schools, all the while preserving the separate racial
character.49 Continuing students were automatically assigned to
the same school or to the corresponding feeder school with a right
to appeal under the Pupil Assignment Law.5" The predictable
effect of this was a perpetuation of the patterns of racial
segregation that already existed with the only relief provided by
appeals for reassignment.5' Considering the discretion given to
the local boards by the Pupil Assignment Law, it is unsurprising
that such appeals were futile." According to a member of the
Board of Education, the superintendent was an "open
segregationist" who "believed in and enforced second class
citizenship for the Negro pupils, teachers, and principals."53
Using the Pupil Assignment Law as cover, the Memphis City
Schools remained entirely segregated through the end of the
45. See id. In addition to providing a facially non-racial justification for
segregation, this Act further protected the individual school members from public
scrutiny by exempting them from charges of "libel, slander or other action, whether
civil or criminal. . . ." Id. at 51.
46. G.W. Foster, Jr., Memphis, in CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A, supra note 14, at 131,
142 ("All 50 Negro pupils who enrolled in [W]hite schools ... were initially assigned
to the schools of their own race in the attendance zone of which they resided.").
47. See id. ("Each elementary school had a distinctive geographic attendance
zone, with Negro schools in effect zoned on one map of the city and [W]hite schools
on another.").
48. Id. at 140 (noting that, as late as 1962, Memphis Public Schools were still
largely segregated).
49. Id. at 142.
50. See id. at 143. For the whole text of the law, see 1957 Tennessee Public
Acts 40.
51. See Foster, supra note 46, at 143 (explaining that the method of
reassignment employed by the board "perpetuate[d] whatever methods of racial
segregation already exist[ed] . . ").
52. See id. at 144 (showing that of 200 appeals, only thirteen Black pupils were
granted a transfer to a White schools).




1960-61 school year (see Chart 1 below).
CHART 1: Memphis City Schools Student Population, 1954-6054
# of
Blacks
School Total # of % of # of % of in
Year Enrollment White White Black Black itWhite
Schools
1954-55 79,781 46,265 58.0% 33,516 42.0% 0
1955-56 83,704 48,268 57.7% 35,436 42.3% 0
1956-57 87,711 49,587 56.5% 38,124 43.5% 0
1957-58 92,429 51,621 55.9% 40,808 44.2% 0
1958-59 103,240 59,518 57.7% 43,722 42.4% 0
1959-60 95,203 53,142 55.8% 42,061 44.2% 0
1960-61 98,408 53,596 54.5% 44,812 45.5% 0
To combat this delay, those seeking desegregation returned
to the venue that delivered the Brown decision. Federal
courtrooms across the South, including the district court in
Memphis, began the work of implementing the Brown decisions
within their own communities.55 The life of Memphis litigation,
however, proved just how difficult using litigation to pursue social
change could be.
II. Passive Resistance: 1961-66
The unsuccessful attempt to enroll Gerald Young at all-White
Vollentine Elementary in September 1958 was the first step
toward litigation in Memphis. 5' After several attempts to convince
the Board of Education to voluntarily desegregate the schools were
ignored, Gerald Young and seventeen other Black school children
filed suit on March 31, 1960 in the federal district court in
Memphis.57 Represented by eight African-American lawyers from
the NAACP-Thurgood Marshall and Constance Baker Motley
from New York and A.W. Willis, Russell Sugarmon, Rev. Ben
Hooks, and three others from Memphis 8-the plaintiffs contended
54. See id. at 53 tbl.III (compiling data from the Memphis City Schools Division
of Educational Research and Planning).
55. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 149-152 for a discussion on the federal
desegregation legislation that took place in Memphis starting in 1960.
56. See generally SILVER & MOESER, supra note 11, at 84-96 (explaining the
history leading to Gerald Young's suit).
57. Id. at 97.
58. See Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross A-i), 302 F.2d 818, 818 (6th Cir.
1962) (listing Plaintiffs-Appellants' counsel).
270 [Vol. 26:261
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that the city operated a dual-race school system and that the
Tennessee Pupil Assignment Law provided no effective remedy to
segregated schools. 9
The case, entitled Northcross v. Board of Education, ° was
heard more than a year later. On May 2, 1961, the judgment from
District Judge Marion Boyd delivered a victory for the Board of
Education, denying the requested injunction and plan for
compulsory integration. He reasoned that the Board did not
"operate a compulsory bi-racial school system," and found that the
plaintiffs had not yet exhausted their administrative remedies
under the Pupil Assignment Law.6" Although the Memphis City
Schools remained entirely segregated, Judge Boyd proclaimed that
the Board "ha[d] evidenced all good faith to [the public and to] this
[c]ourt of its intention to comply with the decision of the United
States Supreme Court."62  The court held that the Pupil
Assignment Law constituted an effective race-neutral
desegregation plan for the city.' Faced with a judicial
endorsement of the Board's delay tactics, the plaintiffs appealed
the decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. 4
A. Breaking the Color Line
Although the district court rejected the specific requests
made by the plaintiffs, the decision placed the Board in an
awkward position. On one hand, the Board hoped to maintain the
credibility of the Pupil Assignment Law as a valid desegregation
plan when the case reached the Sixth Circuit-a panel of judges
from far beyond Memphis's borders. In order to show its good
faith to the appellate court, the Board calculated that some
desegregation must occur.' On the other hand, the Board was
59. SILVER & MOESER, supra note 11, at 97.
60. Northcross D-1, 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 428 (W.D. Tenn. 1961).
61. Id. at 429, 432.
62. Id. at 430.
63. See id. at 430, 432 (noting that the Pupil Assignment Law afforded the
relief sought by the plaintiffs).
64. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 150.
65. See id. at 147. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, known earlier as
simply the Sixth Circuit, has consisted of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, and
Michigan since 1866. See Act of July 23, 1866, 39 Cong. Ch. 211, 14 Stat. 209
(establishing which states would be in which circuits, and stating "that the districts
of Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee shall constitute the Sixth Circuit");
Act of March 3, 1891, 51 Cong. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (establishing the Courts of
Appeal in the same boundaries as the then-existing circuits).
66. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 150 ("[T]he allowance of some
reassignments could be used as evidence of the board's good faith in operating
2008]
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well aware of the highly publicized and confrontational
desegregation occurring in cities, such as Little Rock and New
Orleans, and it wanted desperately to avoid similar confrontations
in Memphis.67 During the late summer of 1961, the Board quietly
began developing general policies for desegregation,
acknowledging for the first time that desegregation was
imminent.' The Board decided that the schools to be integrated
would not be in the lowest socioeconomic White neighborhoods but
would instead be spread geographically across the city; the Board
further hesitated to place fewer than three Black students in any
one school.69
Meanwhile, the NAACP spent the summer of 1961 recruiting
Black parents willing to apply for their children's transfer into
White schools.7" For the 1961-62 school year, the parents of
thirty-nine Black students attended hearings to seek transfers to
all-White schools."1 On September 30, 1961, while Northcross
awaited hearing at the Sixth Circuit, thirteen such transfer
requests were granted, sending thirteen Black first-graders to
desegregate four White elementary schools. 2
The primary goal of Memphis leaders during this historic
time was to avoid negative national publicity by maintaining law
and order. 3 To this end, the Board withheld the announcement of
when and in which schools desegregation would take place.74 City
officials enlisted compliance from the local media, convincing news
outlets to withhold coverage until after the Black students had
entered the schools."5 Any Memphians privy to the desegregation
plan who hoped to stir confrontation were discouraged by a highly
conspicuous police force.7"
These efforts to maintain order, deny segregationists the
opportunity to organize resistance, and prevent the national press
under the placement law as a desegregation 'plan.'").
67. Id. at 147.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 145.
70. See Herenton, supra note 25, at 59.
71. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 150.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 145 (discussing police protection); id. at 147-48 (discussing
publicity).
74. Id. at 147.
75. Roger Biles, A Bittersweet Victory: Public School Desegregation in Memphis,
55 J. NEGRO EDUC. 470, 474 (1987).
76. Id. at 475.
272 [Vol. 26:261
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from flocking to Memphis were largely successful.77 Some of the
parents of the Black children reported that they received a few
threatening phone calls and one received a picture of a rebel flag
in the mail, but the city's action to defuse resistance helped to
avoid further disruption." The color line in the Memphis City
Schools was broken quietly, peacefully, and successfully thanks to
careful control of the process and the bravery of thirteen of the
city's smallest racial pioneers. The efforts to avoid turbulence
were so successful that President John F. Kennedy "lauded
Memphis for its peaceful toppling of [school] segregation, . . .
[saying] the city 'reflected credit on the United States throughout
the world."'79
President Kennedy's praise for Memphis's calm "integration"
disregarded the fact that of 51,815 African-American students,
only 13 were attending formerly all-White schools."° Still, various
leaders in the city--on the Board, in politics, in the media, in the
police, and throughout the Black community-had worked
together to ensure that this minimal desegregation would occur as
smoothly as possible and, largely, it did.8' It was the type of
unified effort to nudge the city forward, however slowly, that
would dissipate as the desegregation litigation continued.8" Such
dissipation may have been inevitable because beneath the
leadership's success lurked the resistance that would emerge once
more-than-token desegregation became imminent."' Although the
leadership avoided disruption in 1961, their actions did nothing to
prepare the community for truly desegregated schools.'
77. Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 148.
78. 'Normal Week' for 13 Integrated Children, TRI-STATE DEFENDER (Memphis,
Tenn.), Oct. 14, 1961, at 1.
79. Biles, supra note 75, at 471 (quoting President John F. Kennedy).
80. See infra Part II.C chart 2.
81. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 145-48 (discussing events leading up to
placing the thirteen Black students in White schools); Biles, supra note 75, at 474
("[Tihe total absence of violence to the breach of the color line in Memphis was due
to the meticulous planning in advance of the event by the community elite.").
82. See generally Biles, supra note 75, at 476-78 (listing examples of Memphis
city officials, such as school board members, the school board president, and the
Mayor, who advocated against busing and encouraged delay in further
segregation).
83. See, e.g., id. (noting the school board's opposition to busing).
84. See id. at 477 (noting that public disapproval of desegregation led to threats
against the judge who issued the order to bus 13,800 students to effect school
desegregation, causing armed guards to be stationed outside his office).
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B. The End of the Pupil Assignment Law
Unlike the school desegregation decisions in neighboring
Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, which were reviewed by the
Fifth Circuit, a circuit consisting entirely of southern states, 5 the
Northcross case was reviewed by the Sixth Circuit, which included
Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee.8 Memphis is in the
extreme southwest corner of Tennessee, as far from Kentucky,
Ohio, and Michigan as is possible within the Sixth Circuit. This
geographical quirk meant that a very Southern city would have its
school desegregation practices reviewed by a very un-Southern
panel of judges.
Satisfied that the enrollment of the thirteen Black first-
graders in formerly all-White schools successfully proved the
Board's good faith in operating under the Pupil Assignment Law
as a desegregation plan, the Board moved to dismiss Northcross
even before the Sixth Circuit could rule.87  The Sixth Circuit
denied the motion and on March 23, 1962 rebuked the Board,
declaring the Pupil Assignment Law inadequate as a
desegregation plan.'
The Sixth Circuit decision was nearly as resounding a victory
for the plaintiffs as the district court opinion had been for the city.
"The Pupil Assignment Law might serve some purpose in the
administration of a school system," the court said, "but it will not
serve as a plan to convert a biracial system into a nonracial one."89
The court noted that more than four years had passed since the
enactment of the Pupil Assignment Law, but as of the initiation of
the Northcross suit, "the schools of Memphis were as biracial as
they had been."9" Commenting on the token desegregation
85. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, known earlier as simply the
Fifth Circuit, consisted of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas from 1866 to 1981, when Georgia, Florida, and Alabama split off to form the
Eleventh Circuit. See Act of July 23, 1866, 39 Cong. Ch. 211, 14 Stat. 209
(establishing which states would be in which circuits and stating "that the districts
of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas shall constitute
the fifth circuit"); Act of March 3, 1891, 51 Cong. Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (establishing
the Courts of Appeal in the same boundaries as the then-existing circuits); Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat.
1994 (1981) (reassigning Georgia, Florida, and Alabama to the new Eleventh
Circuit).
86. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
87. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 150.
88. See Northcross A-i, 302 F.2d 818, 824 (6th Cir. 1962) (stating that the
defendant's belief that full compliance as required by the Supreme Court could be
had under the Pupil Assignment Law was mistaken).
89. Id. at 821.
90. Id. at 822.
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accomplished in September 1961, the court wrote: "The admission
of thirteen Negro pupils . . . is not desegregation, nor is it the
institution of a plan for a non-racial organization of the Memphis
school system."91  The Sixth Circuit declined to define
"desegregation" beyond the meaning given by the Supreme Court
in Brown. Whatever "desegregation" meant, the Sixth Circuit was
clear that placing thirteen out of 51,000 Black students in
formerly all-White schools was insufficient.
The Sixth Circuit ordered the city to restrain from operating
a biracial school system, noting that "[m]inimal requirements for
non-racial schools are geographic zoning . . . and admission to a
school according to residence as a matter of right."92 This was a
minor tightening of the vague Brown II implementation
requirements, but the Sixth Circuit offered no time line for the
Board to submit a plan, effectively leaving the Board again to take
action of its own accord toward desegregation.93
This time, the Board did not delay. Three months later on
August 31, 1962, it submitted its new desegregation plan, calling
for grade-a-year desegregation similar to the plan underway in
Nashville.94 Grades one through three were to be desegregated
immediately for the 1962-63 school year.9 Grade four would be
desegregated in 1963-64 and one grade would be desegregated
each year after that until all twelve grades would be desegregated
at the beginning of the 1971-72 school year.' The plan also
incorporated minimal alterations to the geographic zoning of
school districts, but it allowed for minority-to-majority transfers by
which a White student could transfer out of a majority-Black
school into a majority-White one. 7  The minority-to-majority
transfers substituted individual choice for de jure segregation with
similar effects. On May 25, 1963, Judge Boyd approved the plan
and the NAACP attorneys again appealed to the Sixth Circuit.
98
91. Id. at 824.
92. Id. at 823.
93. See id. at 824 (instructing the defendants to refrain "from operating a
biracial school system in Memphis, or in the alternative to adopt a plan looking
toward the reorganization of the schools" with no time constraints).
94. Herenton, supra note 25, at 71.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross A-2), 333 F.2d 661, 662, 667-68 app.
(6th Cir. 1964).
98. Herenton, supra note 25, at 71.
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C. Memphis Desegregation Outside the Classroom
Two months before the NAACP attorneys filed the Northcross
suit, other NAACP attorneys filed a parallel case against the
Memphis Park Commission for desegregation of city parks,
swimming pools, golf courses, and other public recreational
facilities.' The Park Commission argued for gradual
desegregation, claiming that immediate desegregation would
produce "interracial disturbances, violence, riots and community
confusion."'1°  Desegregation of these facilities, the Park
Commission insisted, would be complete by 1971-a decade
later.10 As Northcross bounced back and forth from the district
court to the court of appeals, the Watson case made its way to the
United States Supreme Court. 10' Just two days after Judge Boyd
approved the Board's grade-a-year plan in Northcross on
remand,"°' the Supreme Court in Watson declared the Park
Commission's similarly gradual plan to be unconstitutional." In
that decision, Justice Goldberg, writing for the unanimous Court,
repeatedly insisted that inconvenience was not a valid excuse for
delaying implementation of constitutionally-guaranteed rights."'
The City's claims that interracial violence would follow
desegregation were met with the declaration that "constitutional
rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their
assertion or exercise."' More strongly, the Court stated: "The
rights here asserted are, like all such rights, present rights; they
are not merely hopes to some future enjoyment of some formalistic
99. Watson v. City of Memphis (Watson District Court), 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 828
(W.D. Tenn. 1961). At the time of suit, these public facilities were actually more
desegregated than the schools-25 of 131 city parks, about 21 of 61 playgrounds, 0
of 12 municipal community centers, 0 of 56 city-operated playgrounds on private
property, 2 of 7 city golf courses, a zoo, and 1 art gallery were desegregated. Id. at
829-30.
100. Watson v. City of Memphis (Watson Supreme Court), 373 U.S. 526, 535
(1963).
101. Id. at 528 n.1.
102. Watson v. City of Memphis, 371 U.S. 919 (1962) (granting certiorari).
103. See Northcross A-2, 333 F.2d 661, 662, 667-68 (6th Cir. 1964) (discussing
Judge Boyd's decision at the District Court and including the desegregation plan he
approved as an appendix to the Sixth Circuit's decision).
104. Watson Supreme Court, 373 U.S. at 539.
105. See generally id. at 531, 533, 537 (noting that the city has a heavy burden to
show that any delay in desegregation is warranted, and that inconvenience falls far
short of that burden).
106. Id. at 535; see also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 284 (1963) (holding that
convictions of African Americans "cannot be sustained on the ground that [their]
conduct was likely to cause a breach of the peace by others, since the possibility of




Though school desegregation was not the issue in Watson, the
Memphis Board of Education could see where the logical path of
Justice Goldberg's opinion might lead. "[L] aw and order are not..
. to be preserved by depriving the Negro children of their
constitutional rights."' ° The Court went on to level its annoyance
with the widespread delay in implementing Brown, noting that
"Brown never contemplated that the concept of 'deliberate speed'
would countenance indefinite delay in elimination of racial
barriers in schools, let alone other public facilities. " "
With such clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the Sixth
Circuit again reversed Judge Boyd on June 12, 1964, declaring the
grade-a-year plan inadequate to meet constitutional
requirements."' In place of the grade-a-year plan, the Sixth
Circuit imposed its own accelerated plan that would desegregate
all grades for the beginning of the 1966-67 school year-four years
faster than the Board's plan."' "The argument that a more
gradual change will avoid interracial disturbances, confusion and
turmoil," the Sixth Circuit held, "was answered in Watson ....
'(C)onstitutional rights may not be denied simply because of
hostility to their assertion or exercise."'1
2
CHART 2: Memphis City Schools Student Population, 1961-661
3
# ofTotal #of %of o f of Blacks Deeg
School Enroll- # of % of in White Deseg
Year ment White White Black Black Schools (%) regated
Year mentSchools
1961-62 112,359 60,544 53.8% 51,815 46.1% 13 (0.03%) 4
1962-63 115,432 60,658 52.6% 54,664 47.4% 42 (0.08%) 6
1963-64 119,687 61,227 51.1% 58,460 48.8% 283 (0.48%) 12
1964-65 121,933 60,090 49.3% 61,841 50.7% 344 (0.56%) 15
1965-66 131,637 66,144 50.3% 65,493 49.8% 1,695 (2.59%) 20
107. Watson Supreme Court, 373 U.S. at 533.
108. Id. at 535 (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958)).
109. Id. at 530.
110. See Northcross A-2, 333 F.2d 661, 664-65 (6th Cir. 1964) (stating that "[i]n
light of the Watson case . . . we are of the opinion that desegregation of the
Memphis schools should be completed before 1970" and thus holding the grade-a-
year plan to be insufficient).
111. Id. at 661.
112. Id. at 665 (quoting Watson Supreme Court, 373 U.S. at 535).
113. Herenton, supra note 25, at 93 tbl.IV (compiling data from the Memphis
City Schools Division of Educational Research and Planning).
20081 277
Law and Inequality
D. What Is "Desegregation?"
It was fairly straightforward as to whether a city park had
been desegregated: either citizens of different races were allowed
in the park or they were not. It was far more difficult to know
when a school or a grade, much less an entire school system, had
been desegregated."4 The courts, the Board, and the community
were left wondering after the Brown implementation decision-
what did it mean for a school district to be "desegregated?"
1 1 5
The obvious first step was to remove the formal barriers to
entry on the basis of race. That was the easy part; even the
Tennessee Pupil Assignment Law accomplished this."6 Far less
clear was what was to happen after that. According to the Board's
definition, the first grade of the Memphis City Schools was
desegregated when thirteen students broke the color line in four
elementary schools." 7 Ten years after Brown was decided, fewer
than one-half of one percent of Memphis's African-American
students were learning in even minimally desegregated schools." 8
The NAACP, on behalf of its clients, felt that this situation was
wholly inadequate, and the Sixth Circuit agreed in Northcross A-
2.1'9  By the end of the 1965-66 school year, a year after
implementation of the Sixth Circuit's accelerated plan, 1,695 Black
students-still less than three percent of the African-American
student population-were in twenty different formerly all-White
schools. 2 ' Was this enough? Could a system be "desegregated" if
some schools remained all-White or all-Black? Was a school with
only one Black student "desegregated"? And where, if anywhere,
was educational quality to fit into this analysis? By the end of
1966, appellate courts were grappling with these questions on a
114. See, e.g., NANCY H. ST. JOHN, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION OUTCOMES FOR
CHILDREN 88 (1975) ("[Dlesegregation is not a simple phenomenon[;] ... there are a
number of dimensions. ").
115. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS U.S.A., supra note 14, at 2-3, 11-18 (discussing
various interpretations of, and outcomes based on, the requirements of the Brown
implementation decision).
116. See Northcross D-1, 6 Race Rel. L. Rep. 428, 430 (W.D. Tenn. 1961)
(explaining that under the Pupil Assignment Act, parents could apply for
assignment or transfer to a different school).
117. See Foster, supra note 46, at 131, 150 (explaining that the Board filed an
affidavit in the Court of Appeals claiming that desegregation had taken place
because the board had approved the reassignment of thirteen Black students to
White schools).
118. See supra Part II.C chart 2 (noting that, by the end of the 1963-64 school
year, 0.48% of Blacks were attending White schools).
119. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Northcross A-2.
120. See supra Part II.C chart 2.
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case-by-case basis with no guidance from the Supreme Court.1 2' It
was clear that relying on local school boards to answer these
questions produced unsatisfactory progress.122
The Supreme Court spoke soon enough, finally beginning to
fill in some of the holes it left in the Brown implementation
decision. 2 1 Meanwhile, during the latter part of the 1960s,
Memphis was consumed by events outside the classroom and the
courtroom; the city's racial relations were brought to the world
stage in a bloody way-despite previous efforts to make Memphis
a model of law and order through a peaceful, if gradual,
desegregation.
III. Tensions Rise: 1967-70
A. Confrontation and Cataclysm
February 1, 1968 was a rainy day in Memphis. 24 To avoid
being drenched, two city sanitation workers-Echol Cole and
Robert Walker-decided to ride in their truck's basin rather than
use the steps and handholds on the outside of the truck. 12  Cole
and Walker had not been sanitation workers very long;2 6 they
were likely unaware of the complaints of faulty vehicles and
equipment that had been lodged by individuals attempting to
create better working conditions for the city's sanitation force.
127
As Cole and Walker stood inside, the electrical apparatus that
operated the garbage compressor shorted out and the truck's
mashing mechanism began to work.'28 Neither man could reach
the stop button on the outside of the truck;2 9 Cole and Walker
121. See Biles, supra note 75, at 476 (noting that after the slowing of integration
in the late 1960s, "[t]he stimulus for change ... [came] in a series of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions destined to strike at the heart of the Memphis school board's
delaying tactics").
122. Id.
123. Id. ("First, the Court ruled freedom-of-choice plans unacceptable if they
failed to desegregate as effectively as other plans would .... Next, the Court held
that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in not insisting on more prompt
action to aid integration .... Finally and most ominously for segregation stalwarts,
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971) the Court ruled in
favor of busing to achieve racial balance in the schools.").
124. JOAN TURNER BEIFUSS, AT THE RIVER I STAND: MEMPHIS, THE 1968 STRIKE,
AND MARTIN LUTHER KING 29 (1989).
125. Id. at 30.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 25-30.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Id.
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were gruesomely crushed to death. 3 '
So began a ten-week period that would transform Memphis
from an example of peaceful, if slow, progress into an international
symbol of American racial conflict.' Cole and Walker, like the
vast majority of the city's sanitation workers,132 were Black. "
Within two weeks of the deaths, the workers went on strike,
demanding union representation, higher wages, and safer working
conditions. 134 The striking workers found an unreceptive audience
in the newly-elected Mayor of Memphis Henry Loeb. Loeb won
election the previous fall by carrying less than 2% of the city's
sizeable Black vote.' 35  Loeb had campaigned as an open
segregationist, and his election contributed to Black
disillusionment with the slowly-grinding political process.'36 The
deaths of the sanitation workers and the resulting strike
represented the first opportunity for the Black community to act
on that disillusionment. 131
For two months, the mayor and union leaders engaged in
bitter and public negotiations 3 ' while striking workers held
marches through downtown Memphis.' The campaign merged
worker rights and civil rights, attracting the attention of Dr.
130. Id.
131. See generally Collins, supra note 25, at 89, 94 ("The image Memphis created
in 1968 has been difficult for the city to overcome .... ).
132. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 43 (noting that the Memphis Public Works
force had a hard time replacing striking workers as most were Black).
133. Teamsters for a Democratic Union, Martin Luther King: 1968 Memphis
Sanitation Strike Was Powered by the Rank and File, http://tdu.org/node/870 (last
visited Feb. 7, 2008).
134. See generally BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 37-57 (describing the beginning
of the Memphis sanitation workers strike).
135. Id. at 57. Memphis Blacks could vote in far greater numbers than most
places elsewhere in the South. See MARCUS D. POHLMANN & MICHAEL P. KIRBY,
RACIAL POLITICS AT THE CROSSROADS: MEMPHIS ELECTS DR. W.W. HERENTON 62
(1996) ("The only place in the South where the Negro had by 1930 made a real
breach in the [W]hite primary system was Memphis." (quoting PAUL LEWINSOHN,
RACE, CLASS AND PARTY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND WHITE POLITICS IN
THE SOUTH 162 (1963))).
136. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 55-57 (describing Loeb's mayoral
appointment in 1967, his opposition to desegregation, and the disappointment that
it created among Black community leaders).
137. See Collins, supra note 25, at 94 (discussing the frustration felt by the Black
community in 1967 and the opportunity to act that came about because of the
strike).
138. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 38 (noting the public arguments between
the mayor and union leaders).
139. See Collins, supra note 25, at 94 ("This strike continued for 65 days along
with a crippling boycott by [B]lacks of downtown business establishments .... ").
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Martin Luther King, Jr.' Dr. King had been building support for
his Poor People's Campaign,' which aimed to address economic
inequality with the same direct action utilized so effectively in the
civil rights movement.1 On March 28, Dr. King led a march
through downtown Memphis,' but the demonstration was
interrupted when a group of young African Americans broke from
the march's peaceful path and began breaking windows along
Beale Street.'" The resulting police response included mace, tear
gas, and gunfire that killed a sixteen-year-old African-American
boy.' In response to the growing sense of confrontation, a curfew
was authorized and the National Guard moved into the city.'"
Despite years of relative calm, Memphis was beginning to provide
the same types of images-including the presence of the National
Guard on city streets-as those produced in Little Rock more than
a decade prior during the desegregation of Little Rock Central
High School."'
Embarrassed that his march had turned violent and fearful
that he was losing control of the nonviolent movement he had led
for so long, Dr. King returned to Memphis on April 3rd with plans
to hold a second march.' 8 Extra precautions were taken to ensure
that the second march would truly be a nonviolent one; " ' Dr. King
waited while the United States District Court in Memphis
considered lifting an injunction that was preventing the march
from moving forward."'5 On the evening of April 4, Dr. King stood
140. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 195-96 ("Martin King committed himself to
Memphis, an involvement he had originally neither envisioned nor desired.").
141. See id. at 59 (describing Dr. King's attempts to drum up support for the
Poor People's Campaign).
142. See id. at 15 (discussing the aim of the Poor People's Campaign: bringing
representatives of the poor to the attention of Congress and other government
agencies).
143. Id. at 211.
144. See generally id. at 211-42 (discussing the problems with the March 28th
Memphis march).
145. See id. at 242 ("Larry Payne was pronounced dead at John Gaston
Hospital.").
146. See id. at 243-45 (discussing the curfew and the National Guard's response
to the violence).
147. For a discussion of the difficulties faced by one of the "Little Rock Nine"
when integrating Little Rock Central High School in 1957, see MELBA PATTILLO
BEALS, WARRIORS DON'T CRY: A SEARING MEMOIR OF THE BATTLE TO INTEGRATE
LITTLE ROCK'S CENTRAL HIGH (1994).
148. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 255-56 (discussing Dr. King's plans to
return to Memphis).
149. See id. at 253-55 (noting that Dr. King spoke with a group of militants
about maintaining his non-violent approach for another march in Memphis).
150. See id. at 267-74 (discussing the ten day march injunction and Dr. King's
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talking with friends on the balcony of the Lorraine Motel in
downtown Memphis. 5' As Dr. King joked with a band standing
below in the motel parking lot, bullets ripped open wounds in his
neck, and he collapsed on the balcony.52 Within an hour, Dr. King
was pronounced dead.'53
In the instant of Dr. King's assassination, all the city's efforts
to maintain law and order to achieve a peaceful-if slow-
transition to desegregate came undone. Rioting ensued in the
wake of Dr. King's death, and the top that had been kept on
Memphis' racial tensions was blown off.' With the veneer of
civility and order removed, the city soon returned its attention to
the desegregation of its city schools, and an era of greater
polarization and confrontation between the increasingly impatient
Northcross plaintiffs and the increasingly obstructionist city
leadership followed.'55
B. Patience Running Thin
Outside of Memphis, the desegregation debate was growing
increasingly confrontational as well. The Supreme Court voiced
its frustration with the glacial pace of school desegregation in
Green v. New Kent County School Board.5 ' In its clearest directive
yet on implementation of Brown, the Court rejected a freedom-of-
choice desegregation plan, declaring: "The burden on a school
board today is to come forward with a plan that promises
realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now."'57
As Green was handed down, the Memphis City Schools were
operating under a freedom-of-choice plan similar to that rejected
by the Supreme Court."5 ' In July 1966, the Northcross plaintiffs
lawyers' attempt to get it lifted).
151. See id. at 290-92 (discussing Dr. King's final moments at the Lorraine
Hotel).
152. See id. at 292-93 (discussing Dr. King's final conversation with musician
Ben Branch and the gunshot that killed him).
153. See id. at 299 ("Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was dead.").
154. See POHLMANN & KIRBY, supra note 135, at 58 ("[F]ollowing the
assassination of Reverend King, the city exploded into days of looting, burning,
sniping, and other forms of mass unrest....").
155. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 55 (noting that Loeb was against
integration and describing the outrage Black community leaders felt towards that
stance).
156. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
157. Id. at 439.
158. See ROBERT M. MCRAE, ORAL HISTORY OF THE DESEGREGATION OF MEMPHIS
CITY SCHOOLS 1954-1974, at 45 (1997) (discussing the desegregation plan of
Memphis city schools); see also Green, 391 U.S. at 433-34 (discussing the freedom-
of-choice plan the Court rejected).
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and the Board settled on a compromised plan without going to
court. 59 The plan revised geographic zones and allowed for free
transfers subject only to space limitations."6 °  The 1966
compromise, which came before the election of Mayor Loeb, the
sanitation strike, and the assassination of Dr. King, was perhaps
the final instance of stable and agreeable action taken by the
Northcross plaintiffs and the Board.
Emboldened by the Green directive and more militant in the
aftermath of the sanitation strike, the Northcross plaintiffs
returned to the district court seeking modifications to the city's
freedom-of-choice plan.16" ' The plaintiffs' requests were heard by
Judge Robert McRae, who replaced the retired Judge Boyd.'62 In
his first ruling, Judge McRae appeared to tread carefully, calling
on the Board to appoint a Director of Desegregation and to file
revised zone lines to supplement the agreed upon freedom-of-
choice plan.'63 Judge McRae's cautious order was affirmed by the
Sixth Circuit, as the appeals court found "no need at [that] time
for precipitous action."'
Apparently dissatisfied with the continuing slow progress
fifteen years after Brown, the plaintiffs pushed the case to the
United States Supreme Court.6 ' The Court in Alexander v.
Holmes County Board of Education" had recently introduced the
term "unitary schools" as the goal of the Brown-inspired
desegregation processes taking place across the country.'67 "Under
explicit holdings of this Court," the Court wrote in Alexander, "the
obligation of every school district is to terminate dual school
systems at once and to operate now and hereafter only unitary
schools."6 ' Relying largely on Alexander, the Supreme Court, in
its only opinion on the Northcross litigation, determined that the
Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the Board's compliance with Judge
McRae's order for a revised freedom-of-choice plan would
159. See MCRAE, supra note 158, at 45.
160. Id.
161. See Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross A-3), 420 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir.
1969) (discussing the plaintiffs' attempt to modify Memphis's school desegregation
plan).
162. MCRAE, supra note 158, at 45.
163. Northcross A-3, 420 F.2d at 547.
164. Id.
165. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross S-1), 397 U.S. 232 (1970).
166. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id. (citing Green v. New Kent County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39, 442
(1968) and Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)).
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ultimately produce a unitary system was premature. 9 The Court
remanded the case to Judge McRae in the district court with
instructions to rule consistently with Alexander's directive 170 to
"terminate dual school systems at once."'7'
As Northcross wormed through the judicial system,
Memphis's move towards racial confrontation accelerated. Though
Watson had desegregated the libraries in 1963,172 the library
restrooms remained segregated 171-so did city water fountains and
privately-owned theaters, hotels, restaurants, and lunch-
counters.' To counter this continued delay, the NAACP built
upon the community-wide activism of the sanitation workers'
strike and initiated a direct action campaign of weekly marches,
daily picketing, nightly mass meetings, selective boycotts, and
targeted economic sanctions of downtown stores.'
7 5
In October 1969, the NAACP's campaign moved to the
schools. Black parents, teachers, and students were encouraged to
strike in protest of the continued segregation of the schools.' On
October 9th and 10th, 40,000 of the city's Black students either did
not attend school or left early in protest. '77 The following Monday,
October 13th, 63,000 students were absent in the first of five
"Black Mondays." 78  The Black Monday movement peaked at
68,000 absent students and 675 absent teachers on October
27th.1
7 9
In November 1969, the NAACP, having partnered with its
union allies,' marched in demand of totally integrated schools
and better African-American representation on the five-member
Board of Education. 8' In a replay of the violence that marred Dr.
King's initial march in March 1968, some marchers hurled bricks
and bottles at downtown store windows.' Wary of inviting
169. Northcross S-1, 397 U.S. at 235.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20).
172. Watson Supreme Court, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
173. See BEIFUSS, supra note 124, at 53.
174. Id.
175. See Herenton, supra note 25, at 90.
176. Id. at 88.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 90.
180. See Collins, supra note 25, at 95-96 (discussing the combined efforts of the
sanitation workers' union and the NAACP).




negative publicity and losing control of its own campaign, the
NAACP halted Black Mondays following the march.'83 However,
the campaign contributed to significant changes in the makeup of
the city's School Board, with some members being chosen in
district-by-district voting-to assure representation of Black
neighborhoods-instead of the previous at-large system.'8 In
1971, the Board expanded from five to nine members. 88 Three of
the new members, including Maxine Smith, the executive
secretary of the local NAACP,' 8 were Black. 
1 87
C. An Impossible Situation
In 1970, Memphis had the tenth largest school district in the
United States, educating 147,290 students, 55% of whom were
Black. "88 Sixteen years after the Brown decision, the Board
considered 101 of the city's 155 schools to be "desegregated."
89
The Board's definition of a desegregated school was a school with
at least one student of a different race attending.19 A different
definition would have told a different story; for example, were
desegregation achieved by having a school with less than 90% of
the majority race, such a definition would lead to a vastly different
conclusion than did the Board's definition. 9' Of the 155 schools,
130 had populations of one race at greater than 90%, and fifty-four
schools remained entirely of one race-thirty-one were all-Black,
twenty-three all-White. 2
183. See Collins, supra note 25, at 96 (stating that the NAACP gave an order to
"send the students back to school on November 17").
184. See id. (noting that six members are elected by district with only three
members chosen at large).
185. See id.
186. See Biles, supra note 75, at 481.
187. See Herenton, supra note 25, at 97.
188. Id.
189. See Bill Evans, City Schools' Integration Speeding up, MEMPHIS PRESS-
ScIMITAR, Oct. 20, 1970, at 1 (on file with Memphis Public Library) (stating that
62.5% of Memphis students were considered to be in a "bi-racial situation" in 1970).
190. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross D-4), 312 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 n.1
(W.D. Tenn. 1970) (noting that the School Board defendants presented statistics
differently from the Northcross plaintiffs in terms of the integration of city schools).
191. Id.
192. Evans, supra note 189, at 1.
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CHART 5: Number of Memphis City Schools by Racial Makeup,
1970193
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The vast majority of Memphis's students were still learning
in highly segregated environments-89% of Black students were
in schools that were more than 90% Black and 39% of Black
students were in all-Black schools. 1
94
CHART 6: Location of African-American Students in the Memphis
City Schools, 1970195
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Similarly, 81% of White students were in schools that were more
than 90% White and 26% of White students still attended all-
White schools."
CHART 7: Location of White Students in the Memphis City
Schools, 1970'9
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Segregated schools persisted in Memphis for several reasons.
As an initial matter, the city's school zones, even the revised zones
mandated by Judge McRae, reflected the city's segregated
neighborhoods.'98 Residential segregation in Memphis actually
increased between 1950 and 1970.'99 This was not an accident.
Between 1934 and 1947, the Federal Housing Authority ("FHA")
encouraged racial restrictions, and the Memphis Housing
Authority ("MHA"), a state-created agency, practiced outright
segregation until 1965.2" This meant that all public housing was
segregated. After 1965, the MHA used its own freedom-of-choice
plan, thus allowing city customs to perpetuate residential
segregation.2 °'
In private housing where choice was unfettered, the situation
was no better. Judge McRae observed that Whites continued to
move from certain areas as the percentage of Blacks increased.2 '
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See MCRAE, supra note 158, at 63 (stating that Memphis realtors had
policies that prohibited racial mixing in housing patterns).
199. Id. at 62-63.
200. Id. at 63.
201. Id.
202. Northcross D-4, 312 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (W.D. Tenn. 1970) ("[Tlhere has
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This pattern of White flight was not solely initiated by school
desegregation, but the school desegregation may have accelerated
the process. For example, in a period of six years, Hollywood
Elementary in central Memphis went from 98% White to 100%
Black.s°  In addition to the choices of the community, several
lending institutions influenced the "choices" in housing locations
by discriminating against Black borrowers, thus preventing many
of them from joining Whites in the migration out of the central
city. 20
For its part, the Board of Education did not help in those
parts of the city that were not as residentially segregated. The
Board gerrymandered school zone lines in less-segregated
neighborhoods to undercut any integration that may occur
naturally due to geographic proximity.0 5 For example, the Lester
school zone was adjacent to the zones of both East and
Treadwell.2" Lester, however, was 100% Black, while East and
Treadwell were 99% White.0 7
As Northcross made its way back into his courtroom in May
1970 against this backdrop, Judge McRae concluded that "the
defendants [were] not maintaining a unitary system."214  While
ordering the Board to promptly file a new plan, Judge McRae
acknowledged the difficulty White flight created for the Board.
"Although the defendants should not refrain from altering zone
lines because of possible adverse racial reaction, they can hardly
be faulted for factors over which they have no control."2 1 Judge
McRae concluded that the city's racial residential patterns-made
worse by the city's continued annexation of White suburban
neighborhoods 2M-° meant that "no substantial desegregation
[could] be effected without transporting pupils, in some cases
many miles." 21' Though Judge McRae could not yet order busing,
it had become clear that the kind of desegregation mandated by
been a tendency for [WIhites to move from certain areas as the percentage of
negroes increases in the area.").
203. See id. (discussing the changing racial enrollment figures at Hollywood
Elementary School).
204. MCRAE, supra note 158, at 63.
205. See id. at 61 (stating that the Board purposely placed schools in areas
where integration would not occur).
206. See id. at 60-62.
207. See Evans, supra note 189, at 5.
208. Northcross D-4, 312 F. Supp. 1150, 1153 (W,D. Tenn. 1970).
209. Id. at 1155.




the Supreme Court could not be achieved without solutions
involving the transportation of students. By the early 1970s, the
time for tolerated delay was ending and the Memphis City Schools
were about to embark on a new and highly divisive phase.
IV. Busing from A to Z: 1971-74
In his 1970 Northcross concurrence, Chief Justice Burger
remarked that the Court ought to develop more specific answers to
desegregation questions, such as whether any particular racial
balance must be achieved in the schools, to what extent school
districts and zones can be altered, and to what extent
transportation must be provided to achieve desegregation.2 12
Although the Court did not provide specific answers in Northcross,
the Court finally provided more concrete guidelines in the spring
of 1971 in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education.
213
A. Swann and the Transformation of the Desegregation
Debate
In Swann, the Court declared that the Constitution did not
require every school in a school system to reflect the racial
makeup of that system.21 ' In addition, the Court noted that the
persistence of one-race or virtually one-race schools did not
necessarily prevent a system from being declared unitary.1 5 Such
schools were permitted so long as the school system could show
that school assignments resulting in one-race schools were
genuinely nondiscriminatory. 6  These two holdings began to
clarify the definition of "unitary." The bar that school districts had
to meet was not so high that the makeup of every school needed to
be balanced uniformly; it was not even so high that the presence of
one-race schools automatically rendered a district segregated." 7
On this score, Swann was somewhat disappointing to
desegregation advocates.1 8
212. Northcross S-1, 397 U.S. 232, 237 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
213. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
214. Id. at 24.
215. Id. at 26.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See, e.g., Kenyon D. Bunch & Grant B. Mindle, Testing the Limits of
Precedent: The Application of Green to the Desegregation of Higher Education, 2
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 541, 570 (1992) ("If numerical integration is not duly
achieved, nothing else matters. But in Swann, the Supreme Court observed that 'it
should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually
one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that
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However, the Swann Court also provided guidance as to the
tools districts could use to achieve unitary status. The Court held
permissible the pairing of noncontiguous attendance zones to
greater balance racial composition of schools was permissible.2 9
Even more significantly, the Court accepted transportation of
students as a proper method of achieving desegregation.22 ° If the
definition of "unitary" was conservative, the toolbox provided by
Swann to reach "unitary" status was radical. School boards were
given the freedom to transport students to and from all corners of
a city to overcome persistent residential and school segregation.
Swann turned desegregation debates into busing debates
across the country. Whereas the idea of lifting racial restrictions
on school assignments had slowly gained some measure of
acceptance, the prospect of actually moving young students to
schools far from their homes to effect racial balance rekindled the
vehement opposition seen in the wake of Brown. With Swann, as
the implementation of Brown's rhetoric became a reality, the
confrontation that had been building in the late 1960s reached a
new height.22 '
In Memphis, the city school system had never provided
transportation for its students.222 Resistance to even the prospect
of busing was quick and widespread. Four months after Swann,
Mayor Loeb introduced a city ordinance that would give the city
council line-item veto power over the school budget."3 The mayor
made his purpose in providing the city council this power plain.
"The strongest tool we have (against busing) is public opinion.
Public opinion can at least be brought to bear on those who spend
the money."224 One of the ordinance's staunchest supporters was
City Councilman Wyeth Chandler, who would become mayor as
the city's impending busing debate intensified. 2'
The following spring, Judge McRae heard six proposals on
how to proceed in the wake of Swann.26 McRae found himself to
still practices segregation by law.'" (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 26)).
219. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28-29.
220, Id. at 30.
221. See, e.g., John E. Lee, The Rise (and Fall?) of Race-Conscious Remedies and
"Benign" Racial Discrimination in Public Education, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 153,
168 n.99 (1996) (discussing various instances of violence following busing plans).
222. See Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (NorthcrossA-5), 466 F.2d 890, 895 (1972).
223. Joe Dove, Council Nose Count Stalls Busing, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Aug. 25, 1971, at 1 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
224. Id. at 2 (alteration in original).
225. Id. at 1.
226. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross D-5), 341 F. Supp. 583 (W.D. Tenn.
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be the arbiter of what was increasingly becoming the city's most
polarizing issue. In his opinion, Judge McRae lectured both sides
for advocating without considering the other side's position.
In this case, the Court has been faced with extreme opposite
positions taken by the respective parties. On the one hand, it
appears to the Court that the defendants have failed to
recognize and acknowledge the interpretations of the
Constitution which impose upon the defendants the duty to
make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of
actual desegregation. It further appears that the defendants
have overemphasized solvable problems as "practicalities"
which justify the continued operation of an effectively
segregated system. On the other hand, it appears to the Court
that the plaintiffs have overemphasized the guidelines of
constitutional law, while failing to take into account the
practicalities of the situation. Therefore, the Court has been
called upon to exercise its eq9uity jurisdiction in favor of a plan
between the two extremes.
Given the task of finding a plan "between the two extremes,"
Judge McRae promptly dismissed any plan that did not involve
busing, noting that nothing more could be accomplished through
zone changes. 2 ' But just as plans that did not bus were no good,
neither was the NAACP's plan for the transportation of 61,350
students; Judge McRae dismissed this as impractical.
29
Ultimately, McRae settled on "Plan A," which closely followed
the Swann guidelines."' Plan A did not use any minimum or
maximum racial percentages to mandate school composition but
instead called for the extensive use of school pairings-where
Black schools would be paired with White schools to draw from a
desegregated attendance pool. 21 The plan called for the busing of
13,789 students but did not affect every school, thus leaving some
schools entirely Black.2 2 Judge McRae noted that, given the
"practicalities of the situation," he knew of no solution that could
desegregate every school. Implementation would begin that fall at
the outset of the 1972-73 school year.2 2  Both sides appealed to
1972).
227. Id. at 596. The adversarial nature of the American legal system and the
difficulty of pursuing social or policy change thereby became cause for indictment
by the court of counsel for both sides, for simply doing their jobs-to wit, strongly
advocating for their clients. See id.
228. MCRAE, supra note 158, at 74.
229. Northcross D-5, 341 F. Supp. at 592-93.
230. Id. at 595.
231. Id. at 591.
232. Id. at 592-93.
233. Id. at 596.
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the Sixth Circuit-the Board sought to avoid busing entirely while
the NAACP sought a plan that would rid the system of one-race
schools.2 4
With busing on the horizon, Citizens Against Busing ("CAB"),
a White parent group organized in the aftermath of Swann,235 took
a page from the NAACP Black Monday boycotts of three years
earlier. CAB-sponsored boycotts in April 1972 resulted in
absences of 52,717 and 56,840 White students on successive
days. 236 A month later, a thousand parents tore up assignment
cards and returned the scraps to the Board of Education.237 At one
particularly enthusiastic demonstration, CAB purchased a bus,
painted it yellow, and buried it in an enormous grave.
2 3 8
The path toward busing in Memphis was slowed temporarily
when the Sixth Circuit granted a stay delaying Plan A
implementation until it heard the Board's appeal.239 On August
29, 1972, however, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court, agreeing with the NAACP that Plan A was
inadequate to fully desegregate the system.240 The Sixth Circuit
ordered Plan A to go forward beginning with the second semester
and ordered the district court to produce a timetable for a further
plan for desegregation.241
After the Sixth Circuit made busing inevitable, the reaction
from leaders opposed to desegregation was swift. Hugh Bosworth,
a Board member, promised to "stand in the schoolhouse door" of
White schools to block the entry of Black students."2 Newly-
elected Mayor Wyeth Chandler vowed to participate in a boycott
"if busing actually begins in the city."24 The resistance from the
city leadership only served to fuel the enthusiasm of CAB. At a
CAB rally attended by two Board members and the mayor, CAB
Chairman Ken Keele wielded a two-by-four, declaring "[t]he very
first moment that any bus rolls in front of any schools, we want a
234. Northcross A-5, 466 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1972).
235. See James Chisum, Clustering Foes Pledge Victory, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Nov. 23, 1971, at 1.
236. Busing Plan in Protest Second Day, MEMPHIS PRESS-SCIMITAR, Apr. 28,
1972, at 1 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
237. Jerry Robbins, Anti-Busing Forces March in Protest, MEMPHIS PRESS-
SCIMITAR, May 17, 1972 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
238. Id.
239. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 463 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1972).
240. Northcross A-5, 466 F.2d 890 (6th Cir. 1972).
241. Id.
242. Biles, supra note 75, at 477.
243. Mayor Mulls Boycott Option, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 2, 1972
(on file with Memphis Public Library).
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phone call and we'll meet those buses and they won't run."44
The reaction in the Black community was more pragmatic
than enthusiastic, as busing was seen more as a tool to achieve a
solution rather than a solution itself.24 Frances Hall, a Black
teacher, endorsed busing as a means of addressing the city's
greater problems, summing up the pragmatic attitude: "We
simply don't seem willing to accept the other person on his merits
when race is involved. And if busing is the means of achieving
this, then we have to bus.2 46
In December of 1972, with the Board under a federal court
order to implement Plan A for the second semester, the Board took
its first step toward compliance by contracting with a bus
company. 4 7  In response, the City of Memphis attempted to
further delay busing by suing its own Board of Education, seeking
to enforce both a recently-passed state law and city charter
amendment forbidding funds to be used for busing.
2 4
1
B. The Buses Roll
Unlike the first school desegregation effort more than a
decade before-when thirteen African-American first graders
broke the Memphis school system's color line and community
outrage was tempered in part by efforts to keep details about the
desegregation secret-everyone knew busing was coming as
January 1973 rolled around. 49  With busing less than a week
away, Mayor Chandler sought to enforce an antiquated city
ordinance requiring bus companies to receive certification after a
public hearing.2 ° On the very morning busing was to begin, the
City Council considered enforcing a seat-belt ordinance that would
have put the buses in violation of the law, but it ultimately voted
against taking such action in the face of the inevitable."'
244. JOHN EGERTON, PROMISE OF PROGRESS: MEMPHIS SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
1972-73, at 9 (1974).
245. Art Gilliam, School Busing: The Black Viewpoint, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Oct. 9, 1972 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
246. Id.
247. Jimmie Covington, Board OK's Contract for Busing After Court Rejects Bid
for Delay, MEMPHIS PRESS-SCIMITAR, Oct. 17, 1972, at 1 (on file with Memphis
Public Library).
248. See City Will Sue School Board over Busing, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Dec. 19, 1972 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
250. Hearing Is Tomorrow on Busing Ordinance, COM. APPEAL (Memphis,
Tenn.), Jan. 17, 1973 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
251. Clark Porteous, Ordinance Designed to Stop Busing Rejected by Council,
MEMPHIS PRESS-SCIMITAR, Jan. 24, 1973, at 1-3 (on file with Memphis Public
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After a weekend scramble to reorganize books, furniture, and
equipment in the 47 schools impacted by Plan A, the city's first
buses rolled out on January 23, 1973.252 Despite the surrounding
hysteria, the day was marked by calm in the city and high
absenteeism in the schools.2  On day one, almost 40,000 students
stayed away from school; although after a week, three-quarters of
the students returned." There was no violence and no standing
in the schoolhouse door. Superintendent John Freeman remarked:
"We've got to be pleased that things went as smoothly as they
did."255  Even Mayor Chandler seemed pleased despite being
unable to stop the buses. "The people in this city have reaffirmed
my belief that although bitterly opposed to busing, they are
equally committed to maintenance of the law." 56 Just as Memphis
had avoided violence and notoriety when its schools first
desegregated, the rule of law won out as the city first attempted to
achieve greater desegregation through busing.
Judge McRae announced the new plan on May 3, 1973.257
Judge McRae called the new plan "Plan Z" "in the hope that this
will be the terminal plan for this long-standing problem in
Memphis."258 Plan Z ordered the busing of 39,904 students, three
times the number under Plan A. 259 To comply with Swann, no
child would be bused more than forty-five minutes in each
direction with more than half of the bused students spending less
than thirty minutes on the bus each way.
Like Plan A, and as permitted by Swann, Plan Z did not
require a fixed racial percentage in the schools. In fact, twenty-
five all-Black schools with 22,000 students were not included in
the plan at all.2"' Judge McRae responded to criticism in his order.
While this court is fully cognizant . . . that the vitality of
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield because of
Library).
252. See Jimmie Covington, Bus Rides Along Smoothly on First Day, MEMPHIS
PRESS-SCIMITAR, Jan. 24, 1973 (on file with Memphis Public Library) (describing
events of that day as experienced by children, bus drivers, and school faculty).
253. EGERTON, supra note 244, at 5.
254. See id. at 14 (noting that seven days later, only 10,000 students were
absent, a number only 3,000 higher than on an ordinary day).
255. See Covington, supra note 252.
256. Id.
257. MCRAE, supra note 158, at 91.
258. Pros, Cons Weighed in McRae's Statement, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.),
May 4, 1973, at 5 (on file with Memphis Public Library).
259. See Judge Orders Busing of 39,904, MEMPHIS PRESS-SCIMITAR, May 3, 1973
(on file with Memphis Public Library).
260. See Pros, Cons Weighed in McRae's Statement, supra note 258, at 1.
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disagreement with them, the fact remains that a system
cannot effectively desegregate by the practice of involuntarily
assigning members of the opposite race to certain schools if
there are not sufficient members of the [Wlhite race available
to assign ... The refusal of the [W]hite students to attend
school with [Bilack students, particularly at [B]lack schools,
results in their leaving the system for private schools or
261
moving to unaffected areas.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed Plan Z, noting that, pursuant to
Swann, the presence of one-race schools did not necessarily prove
the existence of a dual system. 62 On April 22, 1974, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari and effectively put an end to the
Northcross litigation.6
After the initial shock of Plan A, absenteeism approached
normal levels a week later, but the Memphis City Schools would
never be the same after January 23, 1973. The anticipated
resistance never materialized in part because many busing
opponents had immediately (and permanently) abandoned the city
school system, relinquishing their stake in the outcome. Upon
Plan Z's implementation at the beginning of the 1973-74 school
year, more than 20,000 White students had left the Memphis City
Schools.26 This exodus caused the White percentage of city school
students to plummet from 42% to 32% in the span of nine months
as nearly a third of the system's White students disappeared.2 5
These students left for the adjacent Shelby County schools or to
private schools, and Shelby County had trouble building new
schools fast enough. 6 Other students attended a new school
network organized by CAB using space volunteered by churches.2 7
In addition, many students ended up in private schools, some of
which were created by churches in direct response to demand
created by the desegregation order.2 " Although the
implementation of busing, like the first desegregation thirteen
years earlier, had been largely peaceful, the massive departure of
White students left a lasting and debilitating impact on the
261. Id. at 3 (alterations in original).
262. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. (Northcross A-6), 489 F.2d 15, 15 (6th Cir. 1973).
263. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 416 U.S. 962 (1974) (denying certiorari).
Litigation regarding attorneys' fees due to the NAACP from the School Board
continued, resulting in continued tension and animosity between the two sides. See
Northcross v. Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1979).
264. Daniel Mel, Goal of Diversity Is Elusive, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.),
May 16, 2004, at B3.
265. Id.





system.269 The percentage of White students continued to drop
over the next three decades, helping to produce a system incapable
of ever offering integrated school environments to the majority of
its students.
V. Epilogue: Memphis Schools 50 years After Brown
Plan Z remained in effect without modification until April
1982, when a three year desegregation study performed by a
twenty-seven member biracial committee proposed several
changes to Judge McRae."' The new plan eliminated some bus
trips that were transporting Black students to schools that had
become predominantly Black. '72  In addition, the new plan
eliminated all elementary school clustering and brought new bus
routes into newly-annexed and mostly White areas of the city.
2 73
Finally, the Memphis City Schools began to offer "Optional
Schools" that would provide advanced programs or alternative
educational options for parents. 274 The Optional Schools were the
first comprehensive effort to address school quality, as opposed to
simply the schools' racial makeup.
The modified Plan Z remained in effect with minor annual
changes until November 9, 1992, when the plaintiffs consented to
putting Northcross on inactive status and federal court supervision
of the Memphis City Schools' desegregation effectively ended.275
On April 23, 1999, the Northcross case was formally discharged. 76
The case was not dismissed because the plaintiffs had achieved
their initial goals; rather, by the 1990s, it was clear that
desegregating the Memphis City Schools was no longer an
accomplishable task.
When Brown was decided in 1954, the Memphis city school
system was rigidly segregated, serving a student population that
269. See Kiel, supra note 264, at B3 (noting that the resulting drop in enrollment
by the flight of White students to private schools "led to slashed funding" of
Memphis public schools).
270. See id. (noting that "[t]he 30 years after busing have seen the trend toward
informal segregation continue," with Black students making up 86% of the
Memphis City School population, compared to the 9% made up of White students,
in 2003).
271. McRAE, supra note 158, at 136.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 137.
274. Id. at 128.
275. Id. at 138.




was 58% White and 42% Black. 77 On the 50th anniversary of
Brown, the face of the schools looked decidedly different. In 2004,
86.4% of Memphis City Schools students were Black; only 8.9%
were White.278  The overwhelming Black majority has led
inevitably to a number of highly segregated schools. In 2004, a
full twenty-five of the schools had 100% African-American
populations. 9 More than half of the schools, serving more than
78,000 of the city's 116,000 students, were more than 90% Black. °
Meanwhile, the suburban Shelby County Schools, which ring
the city, provide a near-mirror image. The county schools, serving
roughly 50,000 students, have a population that is 68.2% White
and 26.3% Black. 281' By school ratings under the No Child Left
Behind2 2 benchmarks and in measurements of student outcomes,
such as dropout and graduation rates, the county system
outperforms its city counterpart, suggesting that the schools of
Memphis in 2004 are not only segregated, but unequal.2 '
A third system operating in Memphis fifty years after Brown
is a mostly-White private school system. In the wake of Plan Z,
new schools were created to serve White students exiting the city
school system. These new schools, some of which had been created
by anti-busing organizations like CAB, joined the city's already-
existing private schools as a haven safe from Judge McRae's
busing orders.2" The CAB schools disappeared very quickly, as
was typical for private schools elsewhere created in response to
busing; by the end of the first full school year under Plan Z, they
277. Herenton, supra note 25, at 53 tbl.III.
278. TENN. DEP'T OF EDUC., MEMPHIS REPORT CARD 2004 (2004) [hereinafter
MEMPHIS REPORT CARD 2004], available at http://www.k-12.state.tn.us
/rptcrdO4/system.asp.
279. Id. This statistic was determined through a school-by-school search on the
Tennessee Department of Education's website.
280. Id.
281. TENNESSEE DEP'T OF EDUC., SHELBY COUNTY REPORT CARD 2004 (2004)
[hereinafter SHELBY COUNTY REPORT CARD 20041, available at http://www.k-
12.state.tn.us/rptcrdO4lsystem.asp.
282. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002) (attempting to improve U.S. primary and secondary schools by increasing
the standards of accountability for states, school districts, and schools, requiring
frequent testing, setting benchmarks below which a school is deemed "failing," and
allowing parents greater flexibility in choosing their child's school).
283. Compare id. (showing a dropout rate of 5.9% and a graduation rate of
87.6%), with MEMPHIS REPORT CARD 2004, supra note 278 (showing a dropout rate
of 19.8% and a graduation rate of 60.4%).
284. See Biles, supra note 75, at 479 (noting that twenty-six CAB "education




were out of business.285 However, a second group of private schools
created in busing's wake and directly affiliated with large local
churches continued to thrive in Memphis as in no place else.
Three brand new private school systems-Southern Baptist
Educational Center, Frayser Baptist Schools, and Briarcrest
Baptist School System-survived the first few difficult years and
quickly became an institutionalized part of the Memphis schooling
scene.28  By combining the schools with churches on a single
campus, these systems had little choice but to continue
operating.87 Many of these schools continued to thrive in 2004 as
part of what is the most segregated system of private schools in
the country. 88  In 1990, the White-to-Black ratio in Memphis
private schools (13.6:1) was nearly twice as high as that of the
second most segregated private school system.28
Thus, even fifty years following Brown, the majority of
schools in the Memphis area-city, county, and private-remained
racially identifiable. The promise of Brown, an end to separate
and unequal education, seems to have evaded Memphis entirely.
However, it is not enough to simply declare that segregation
persists in Memphis. The relevant questions are: is persistent
segregation a problem?; could Memphis's segregated schools of the
21st century have been avoided?; and what can the Memphis
school desegregation narrative teach us today, in Memphis and
elsewhere?
Conclusion & Evaluation
Whereas the primary directive of Brown was to end the legal
mandate of segregated schools, the issue in 2008 is no longer the
eradication of de jure segregation (except in districts still not
declared unitary). The legal regime struck down by Brown is gone,
even if its effects continue to plague society. Thus, the question
today is whether school districts ought to pursue diversity with the
goal of integrated classrooms and schools. Underlying this is
another question: is persistent de facto segregation, such as exists
in Memphis, bad?
A multitude of social science and educational research
suggests that racially integrated schools provide significant social
285. See id. at 479-80.
286. See James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban Veto, 90 Va.
L. Rev. 1635, 1636-38 (2004).
287. Id.




and educational benefits to students and communities.290 Among
the benefits are more tolerant viewpoints concerning individuals of
different racial groups and lower levels of intergroup prejudice.29'
In addition, studies have shown increased academic achievement,
higher graduation rates, and even higher adult incomes for
African Americans who learn in integrated environments.
In addition, as local schools have a direct impact on the local
economy, racially isolated schools can have a negative effect on the
economy of a city. As long ago as 1978, the trickledown effect of a
large segment of the city abandoning the city's primary school
system was identified in an editorial in The Commercial Appeal.93
When Whites leave the school system majority Black, the system
loses broad public support. As a result, funding suffers. When the
system is underfunded, it is unable to provide as high a quality of
education and the city's labor pool is under-educated. Left with an
unskilled labor pool, without workers who can be trained quickly
and effectively, industry is unlikely to invest in the city. Without
investment, the city cannot grow economically or culturally. 94
By this argument, persistent segregation in the Memphis
City Schools is a bad thing for all Memphians. Indeed, as the city
lost its White students-and the per pupil funding those students
brought with them--the schools lost something less tangible and
immeasurably more important: local government's traditional
willingness to support public education. Today, the Memphis City
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Schools serve more than twice the number of students as the
Shelby County Schools and local private schools combined.2 5 All
Memphians, regardless of whether their children attend the city
schools, have a stake in seeing these students succeed.
In evaluating the Memphis desegregation narrative, one
must ask whether today's racially isolated school situation could
have been avoided. Despite a somewhat promising, if slow,
beginning, during which leaders from both the White and African-
American communities allowed for gradual and peaceful change,
the Memphis school desegregation had a variety of factors working
against it. Some were unique to Memphis-the city's sprawling
geography and failure to consolidate the city and county school
systems, for instance, made the practicalities of desegregation
extraordinarily difficult. In addition, a low local tax rate enabled
many parents to afford private schools, making those schools a
296
more widespread option than in other cities.
Other factors, however, would be relevant to any effort to
pursue social change in a reluctant community. Most
significantly, the city's most visible leaders never embraced the
goal of desegregation and instead consistently alluded to the
maintenance of law and order. Any action taken was due to a
court directive rather than because the substance of that order
was intrinsically right. The concerted effort to keep Memphis from
becoming a national symbol of obstruction like nearby Little Rock
may have succeeded in a peaceful start to desegregation, but the
city's delay in taking action and failure to do any more than
minimally required signaled to the greater community that
resistance was to be tolerated and even endorsed. Then, as the
desegregation era intensified, Memphis was led by Henry Loeb
and Wyeth Chandler, two openly segregationist mayors, who made
meaningful desegregation even less likely. Rather than preparing
Memphians for desegregation and allowing for the progress
ordered by the district court, these mayors joined multiple
members of the School Board to make compromise impossible,
stoking racial conflict. In this context, the crises of the late 1960s
seem unavoidable, beginning with the election of Loeb in 1967-
with virtually no Black votes-and culminating with the
295. Compare MEMPHIS REPORT CARD 2004, supra note 278 (showing total
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assassination of Dr. King amidst the sanitation workers' strike.
Indeed, those crises uncapped all efforts to move desegregation
forward slowly and peacefully by helping to radicalize the African-
American community and by removing the incentive of avoiding
negative publicity from the White leadership's calculations.
Further, the adversarial imperative of litigation discouraged
the sides from seeking common ground. The parties did in fact
reach a compromise without court intervention in 1966, but the
compromise quickly unraveled when it became clear to the
plaintiffs that the Supreme Court would demand more than the
token desegregation the Board was willing to offer. 97 As busing
became imminent, both sides proposed extreme positions. The
district court was forced to settle on a plan that satisfied neither
side; the Board thought Judge McRae had gone too far, while the
plaintiffs thought he had not gone far enough.29
The adversarial positions spilled outside the courtroom and
into the community, further impeding positive progress and
community reconciliation. Of course, the magnitude of the social
change being pursued, coupled with the complexities of the
litigation, drowned out the interests of the children most directly
impacted by the decision. Not until the movement toward
Optional Schools in the 1980s were educational considerations
taken into account.2
In addition, the Memphis litigation-indeed, school
desegregation litigation generally-demonstrates the practical
limits of court-ordered social change. Courts are very good at
shifting the field of legal legitimacy, and Brown is perhaps the
most important example of this in American history. However,
without the ability to do more than evaluate school board decisions
or select among choices proposed by the respective parties, the
district courts proved largely impotent in the face of community
resistance. This was particularly troublesome in the unavoidably
fuzzy area of school desegregation. Whereas in the context of
desegregating public facilities, plaintiffs could focus on the legal
principle involved-an end to segregation. When it came to
schools, desegregation advocates were forced to push for remedies,
such as busing. As Memphis demonstrates, the shift in the
debate, from one about desegregation to one about busing, proved
to be the death knell for effective integration in the Memphis City
297. See supra text accompanying notes 156-64.
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Finally, the inability of courts to control events occurring
outside both the courtroom and classroom further evidenced the
limits of litigation. As the district court handed down its orders in
a virtual legal vacuum, the community affected by those orders
simmered with racial divisiveness. The election of Mayor Loeb in
1967 without any Black support, the sanitation workers' strike in
1968, and the assassination of Dr. King in Memphis probably had
more of an impact on the desegregation of the city schools than
any court order. Unable to account for these events-events that
unfolded more quickly than any litigation could-the district court
was prevented from assessing the success of its directives.
As desegregation orders become history, school districts are
left to choose one of two routes: either they may take affirmative
steps to maintain some level of integration, or they may do nothing
and allow schools to "naturally" re-segregate. For those districts
seeking to maintain the integration they were required to achieve
for a half-century, the Memphis narrative from 1961-74 and the
resulting inequities that exist today provide a case study of the
difficulties of implementing such policies. Most significantly, the
community breakdown over busing in Memphis and the White
community's abandonment of the city schools show the dangers of
allowing the focus of the debate to shift from the educational,
social, and economic benefits of integrated classrooms to the
methods of implementation. Busing for the sake of achieving
racial balance will always be unpopular among parents. In
contrast, integration for the sake of improving educational
outcomes is far more likely to be embraced.
Ultimately, the Memphis story returns to obstructionist
leaders and a highly racialized community. Perhaps Memphis
could have succeeded if it had a leader during the Northcross era
who was unafraid of embracing the principle of desegregation,
even tepidly. This could have only been accomplished through
years of calling for not only order, but justice in implementing
Brown, arguing to the community that desegregation was not only
constitutional, but also good for the future of the city.
As Memphis continues to confront issues that tend to divide
the community along racial lines, the Northcross era provides
useful lessons to help prevent a repeat of the breakdown that
produced the racially isolated schools of today. First, leadership
matters. Second, litigation is limited in its ability to impose social
change on an unwilling community. Finally, it takes planning and
coordination among parties with disparate interests to move a city
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forward sensibly and peacefully.

